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ABSTRACT 
Shai M. Tamari – Conflict over Palestine: Zionism & the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 
1945 – 1947 
(Under the direction of Prof. Sarah Shield) 
 
          The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was charged in 1946 with finding 
solutions for the Jewish Holocaust survivors still lingering in displaced persons’ 
camps across Europe, and with proposing ways to end the continuous friction among 
Jews and Arabs in Palestine. The paper addresses the impact that Zionism had on 
both the Jewish Holocaust survivors in the displaced people’s camps, and the Zionist 
leaders who preached its validity to the Committee. The paper makes a distinction 
between the idea of Zionism and the practice of Zionism, and argues that the idea of 
Zionism was needed by the Holocaust survivors as it gave them hope, but that the 
practice of establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine endangered the possibility for 
a safe and prosperous life for the Jewish people, because the Jewish state would be 
established in a hostile environment. It argues that the need for cooperation between 
Jews and Arabs, rather than competition, is still valid today.   
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"...Any man [or woman...] who denies justice 
to someone he hates prepares the way for a 
denial of justice to someone he loves." 
 
                                                                             Wendell Willkie1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Bosworth, Patricia. Anything Your Little Heart Desires: An American Family Story (New York, N.Y.: 
Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 186. 
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Introduction  
“There are some who want the State for the State’s sake. They are State mad, not 
realising that the State is something these days that perhaps needs revision in its old 
conception and practice of the State…”2 These were the words of Dr. Judah Magnes, head 
of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, as he testified in front of the Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry on March 14, 1946. The State he was referring to was the Jewish 
State planned for Palestine, and the people at whom he was aiming his accusations 
included the Jewish Agency, the official representative of the Jewish people in Palestine. 
Dr. Magnes told the Committee that the Jewish people did not require a Jewish state, either 
in order to assist the Jewish survivors in displaced persons’ camps in post-war Europe or 
to meet the needs of those Jews living in Palestine already.  Indeed, he claimed, all that the 
Jewish people needed was the ability to immigrate to Palestine and to live a peaceful life. 
He did not believe in partitioning Palestine or of having a majority of any kind rule over a 
minority, both of which he predicted would lead to endless friction between Jews and 
Arabs. Thus, Dr. Magnes was able to distinguish between what many Jews really wanted – 
to practice Zionism by establishing a Jewish state, and what they must have – a peaceful 
and prosperous life. He understood that the two were incompatible, simply because the 
establishment of a Jewish state would happen in an area populated by non-Jews, the Arabs 
of Palestine. He predicted that the practice of Zionism would not meet the needs of those 
who advocated its ideology. His arguments were convincing to the Anglo-American 
Committee, which had just been charged with determining the fate of Palestine. 
                                                 
2 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Jewish Problems in Palestine and Europe. Public 
Hearings, 1945-1948 (Switzerland: Zug, 1977), p. 31. Hearing took place in Jerusalem, Palestine, on 
March 14, 1946.  
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The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (henceforth the Committee) was 
established at the end of 1945 by the British and American governments, and conducted its 
investigation in the early months of 1946. The Committee was charged with finding 
solutions for the Jewish Holocaust survivors still lingering in Displaced Persons’ (DP) 
camps across Europe, and with proposing ways to end the continuous friction among the 
various groups in Palestine, and between them and the British Mandatory government.  
This paper addresses the impact that Zionism – Jewish nationalism, which aimed at 
protecting the Jewish people from anti-Semitism – had on both the Jewish Holocaust 
survivors, and the Zionist leaders who preached its validity to the Committee. It makes a 
distinction between needs – what people must have to live a prosperous life (such as 
physical safety, the freedom to practice one’s religion and culture without fear, and to be 
free from domination by another power), and interests – what people really want, even 
though it is not necessary for a prosperous life. When Jewish Holocaust survivors followed 
the idea of Zionism, they were attempting to meet their needs for a secure and prosperous 
life after years in Nazi camps - they believed that Zionism could provide them what they 
so desired. When Jews who arrived into Palestine practiced Zionism, they were attempting 
to meet their interests by establishing a Jewish state. The practice of Zionism – the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine - endangered the possibility for a safe and 
prosperous life because the Jewish state would be established in a hostile environment. 
The Arabs of Palestine, like the Jews, also needed to not be governed by others after 
centuries of occupation by the Ottoman Empire and the British. However, like the Jewish 
Agency, Arab leaders had an interest in establishing their own state in Palestine, if only to 
guarantee self-governance in the twentieth century nation-state module.   
The Committee understood that the Holocaust survivors needed an ideology to pull 
them out of the depths of despair to which they had sunk after the war, but that the practice 
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of an ideology, which provided rights and benefits to one people on a land where two 
peoples lived, could only end in disaster and an ever-lasting conflict. The Zionist leaders in 
Palestine, through the Jewish Agency, were interested in having a Jewish State on the 
entire area of British-mandated Palestine. Considering that there was an Arab majority in 
Palestine, this would mean that the Jewish minority would then govern the majority - an 
idea and practice that would not be tolerated by the Arabs, and thus end in conflict.  
The argument this paper poses is simple and straightforward: When the Committee 
recommended allowing 100,000 Jewish Holocaust survivors into Palestine, but did not 
allow for the creation of either a Jewish or an Arab state in all or part of Palestine, the 
Committee was acting on its understanding that the needs of the Jewish Holocaust 
survivors in the DP camps and the Jews in Palestine, were inconsistent with the interests of 
these same people. The Committee thus followed Dr. Magnes’s recommendations. They, 
like Dr. Magnes, attempted to see all sides of the conflict, and find a resolution to benefit 
both Jews and Arabs without being biased in favour of either side, and without considering 
the interests of outside forces, including their own governments. Although the interests and 
needs of the Arabs of Palestine, the British, and the Americans would have a great impact 
on the eventual decisions on the future of  Palestine, this paper focuses on Jewish needs 
and interests. It does so because it was the interests of Zionist-Jews to have a state in 
Palestine that was the root of the conflict, and it was the Zionist leaders’ insistence on 
controlling Palestine that set in motion Arabs’ suspicion and hostility towards the Jewish 
population of Palestine.  
The Committee’s recommendation that the Arabs and Jews should not be separated 
in Palestine, but rather brought together to cooperate towards working for a better life, are 
still valid today, over sixty years later. The Committee members were driven by a sincere 
desire to inquire and understand the conflict between Palestinian-Arabs and Palestinian-
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Jews.3 By going back to the “basics,” as they understood them, one might be able to 
comprehend better a conflict that has gone on for too long, and is in much need of a 
resolution.  
Although many secondary sources have been used towards this research, this paper 
relies mostly on records of the Committee’s hearings, the perspectives of various parties to 
the conflict, and the memoirs of Committee members. I have focused particularly on 
Richard Crossman’s memoir, Palestine Mission – A Personal Record (1947) because it 
addresses many of the central questions of this paper. Crossman’s attempt to understand 
the conflict is the backbone of this paper.4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 During the British Mandate, which lasted from 1922 until 1948, all inhabitants living in Palestine, 
except for the British, were considered Palestinian. The two groups were divided between Palestinian-
Arabs and Palestinian-Jews. After the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, Palestinian-Jews became 
“Israelis,” and Palestinian-Arabs became “Palestinians.”  
4 Prior to becoming a Cabinet Minister in the British Parliament, Richard Crossman served in France 
and Germany as Deputy Director, Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied 
Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). Crossman was a student at Oxford and the University of Berlin of 
philosophy. He was the assistant editor of the Labor Party Weekly, the New Statesman and Nation, and 
joined the Ministry of Information when the WWII erupted. In 1940 he became the director of the 
German section, Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, where he organised the BBC 
German broadcast, and then moved to Algeria for similar psychological warfare techniques against the 
Germans. Crossman became a Member of Parliament in 1945. He was 38 years old when he joined the 
Committee, and was chosen due to his experience (Podet, 1986:85-88).  
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The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 
 
The preface of the final report issued by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 
on April 20, 1946, stated its four objectives:5 The first was to examine the political, 
economic and social conditions in Palestine “as they bear upon the problem of Jewish 
immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the people now living” there. The 
second was to examine the position of Jewish people in those European countries where 
they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and “the practical measures 
taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from 
discrimination,” whether in Palestine or in countries outside of Europe. The third objective 
was to “hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and 
Jews on the problem of Palestine,” and to make recommendations to the US and British 
governments based on those hearings and other investigations. The fourth and last 
objective was to make recommendations to the US and British governments for corrective 
action in those European countries, where Jewish refugees recently liberated from 
concentration camps had opted to remain, or to facilitate their emigration and settlements 
in countries outside Europe.   
The reasons for the establishment of the Committee were numerous, and each side, 
the American and the British, had their own goals. From the American perspective, when 
WWII ended, US President Harry Truman saw the need for a speedy and positive solution 
for the tragic situation of Jewish refugees in Europe, whether due to his compassion for the 
suffering of the European Jews, his guilt that the US did not assist earlier in protecting 
Jews from Nazi prosecution, political pressure from within the US, American immigration 
laws that prevented Jewish immigration into its borders after WWII, or a combination of 
                                                 
5  Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Report to the United States Government and His Majesty’s 
Government in the United Kingdom, Lausanne, Switzerland, April 20, 1946, p. vii. 
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all of the above. British Prime Minister Clement Atlee was under US pressure to allow 
100,000 Jews into Palestine, and pressured from within to solve the problem of Palestine, 
where his troops were under daily attacks by Jewish brigades.6  
The British had received a mandate to govern Palestine from the League of Nations 
in the 1920 San Remo conference, charged by the League to prepare Palestine for 
independence. The failure of the British to move Palestine towards independence was 
frustrating its inhabitants (both Arabs and Jews), who felt they had to fight the British for 
what they considered to be their rights. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was 
interested in involving the US government in forming a policy on Palestine for two 
primary reasons: to reduce the pressure the British government was receiving from the US 
to allow Jewish refugees into Palestine, and to reduce the growing popularity of the Soviet 
Union and its influence over Jews in Europe and the population living in Palestine. Bevin 
told his cabinet colleagues that American agitation over the Palestine issue “was poisoning 
British relations with the United States Government on other issues.”7 Bevin accused the 
US of using the plight of Jewish Holocaust survivors for political gain, and accused 
Zionist propaganda in New York of diminishing the possibility of bringing Jews and Arabs 
to the negotiation table. By involving the US government in Palestine, Bevin hoped to 
prevent the US from returning to isolationism, as happened after WWI, and increase the 
possibilities of the US adopting a British course in the Middle East. And so a committee 
was formed with twelve members, six British and six Americans, to inquire, investigate, 
and provide solutions to the dilemmas these two nations faced in a region both knew 
                                                 
6 The figure of 100,000 was due to a report written by Earl Harrison, who was commissioned by 
President Truman to survey the DP camps in Europe. 
 
7 Kochavi, Arieh J. Post-Holocaust Politics – Britain, the United States, and Jewish Refugees, 1945-
1948 (Chapel Hill, NC & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 102.  
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would become the new “battlefield” over opinion and oil.8 The formation of the 
Committee was not an intellectual exercise by the US and British government, but a 
sincere attempt to solve the settlement problem of the Jews in the DP camps, and to end 
the disaster that was Palestine. The Committee was promised by British Foreign Secretary 
Bevin that if they reached their solutions unanimously, the recommendations would be 
followed through. 
It was Bevin who decided on the qualifications of the Committee members: No 
Arabs, no Jews, and no women. Each member had to be a person of “sound common sense 
and integrity,” and most importantly, none of them could have committed to one side of 
the issue of Palestine.9 The original plan was to find experts to become members of the 
Committee, but none could be found who had not already taken a public position on the 
issue. And so, on the British side, the members were mostly politicians - a judicious 
balance of various shades of political opinions – A Labour peer, a Labour MP, a 
Conservative MP, an academic, an international labour organiser, and an economist. The 
British team was in stark contrast to the American team, who were predominantly 
Democrats, but did not hold government office.10  They included a Court of Appeal judge, 
the editor of the Boston Herald, a former chairman of the board of the Foreign Policy 
Association and High Commissioner for Refugees, an academic, a career diplomat, and a 
San-Francisco lawyer. Richard Crossman, MP, remarked that “our committee had several 
unusual features. It was Anglo-American and it was composed of men who were not 
                                                 
8 There was a deliberate attempt by both the US and Britain not to involve the Soviets in the 
Committee, as both the US and Britain wanted to minimize any influence the Soviets may have on the 
Middle East. Ivan Maisky, the former Soviet Ambassador to London, commented to the Committee 
that, “Your country [the US] has made the situation rather difficult by not insisting that Russia be 
represented on your committee of inquiry. The fact that Russia is not represented can only lead to 
delay” (Crum, 1947:64). Maisky was warning that because of Britain’s activities in the Middle East, it 
may make it impossible for Russia to accept the Committee’s recommendation. 
9 Podet, Allen H. The Success and Failure of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945-1946 – 
Last Chance in Palestine (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), p. 82.  
 
10 Ibid.  
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specialist but representatives of the man in the street. We were more like a jury than a 
commission.”11 
Although Allen H. Podet argues that the Committee members maintained their 
integrity throughout, developing wise and informed assessments of a complex problem, 
others were less impressed with the committee’s project.12 One of them was Omar Dejany, 
a young Palestinian-Arab who testified in front of the Committee in Jerusalem, arguing 
that, 
Killing a man and walking in his funeral is a known proverb, but harming a man 
and inquiring from his people about the cause for their sorrow is a case which no 
vocabulary has yet known, but… should be added to the English one… There is 
nothing more strange on behalf of the English than appointing committees of 
inquiry as though they do not know the causes and remedies… as though they are 
not… responsible for our difficulties.13 
 
Nachmani argues in Great Power Discord in Palestine (1987), that one of the  
differences between the American and British teams was that the Americans were much 
more aloof from political entanglements in Palestine. “They could maintain the stances of 
objective observers, feeling sympathy for the enterprising spirit of the Jewish pioneers and 
contempt for the imperial power which was caught in the middle.”14  
The Committee assembled in Washington, DC, on Friday, January 4th, 1946. Its 
inquiries would take them from the US capital to the British capital, then into Europe, 
where they divided into sub-committees, and conducted investigations in Germany, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy, and Greece. In Europe they talked to British and 
                                                 
11 Crossman, Richard, MP. Palestine Mission – A Personal Record (New York & London: Harper & 
Brothers Publishers, 1947) p. vii.  
12 Podet, Allen H. The Success and Failure), p. 11.  
 
13 Nachmani, Amikam. Great Power Discord in Palestine – The Anglo-American Committee of 
Inquiry into the Problem of European Jewry and Palestine, 1945-1946 (London: Frank Cass, 1987), 
pp. 87-88. Ironically, Dejany was referring to the Arabs of Palestine, yet the same could have been 
argued by the Jews in Europe, who were forbidden by British forces to immigrate to Palestine. 
 
14 Ibid., p. 79. 
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US commanders, leaders of nations, religious leaders, and many Jewish Holocaust 
survivors. From Europe they travelled to the Middle East, and visited Egypt, Syria, 
Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, Trans-Jordan, and of course, Palestine. They spoke to 
sheikhs, presidents, kibbutz farmers, British intelligence officers, Haganah members, 
Zionist leaders, and advocates for an independent Arab nation in Palestine. They left for 
Switzerland on March 28th, 1946, and less than a month later, produced their report.   
The Committee was the seventeenth to investigate Palestine, so it was no wonder 
that Albert Einstein declared the Committee a “smoke screen,” when he was questioned by 
the Committee in Washington, DC, arguing that the Colonial office would impose its own 
policies, and that he was “absolutely convinced that the council [Committee] will have no 
effect.”15 One did not to have come up with the theory of relativity to understand that 
nations tend to pursue their own interests, even in the face of opposing recommendations 
from their own representatives.  
The “death” of the Committee’s report occurred on July 25, 1946, just three 
months after its publication. It was the day the British government announced it was going 
to hold discussions in London on the Committee’s recommendations with Arab, Jewish, 
and American leaders. The Jewish delegation refused to attend, and the Arab delegation, 
which needed to be prompted to attend, showed signs of discontent with the 
recommendations. The British were already looking at other options, which would better 
please the warring Arab and Zionist sides, and find a way out of the hole into which the 
British had dug themselves.  
The Committee’s report, comprising 92 pages, was unpopular with the British, the 
Arabs, and the Jews.  Its ten recommendations dealt with immigration, land policy, 
equality of standards, economy, and education. Not surprisingly, the second 
                                                 
15 Crum, Bartley C. Behind the Silken Curtain, p. 26. 
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recommendation called for “100,000 certificates (to) be authorised immediately for the 
admission into Palestine of Jews who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist 
persecution.”16 This recommendation responded to the immediate need to save and/or 
improve the lives of those Jewish survivors in the Displaced People’s camps. The third 
recommendation dealt with the need to prevent future conflicts in Palestine, and the 
Middle East; it was titled: Principles of Government: No Arab, No Jewish State, and read: 
In order to dispose, once and for all, of the exclusive claims of Jews and Arabs to 
Palestine, we regard it as essential that a clear statement of the following 
principles should be made: I. That Jew[s] shall not dominate Arab[s] and Arab[s] 
shall not dominate Jew[s] in Palestine. II. That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish 
state nor an Arab state. III. That the form of government ultimately to be 
established, shall, under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the 
interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Muslim and Jewish faiths… 
because it is a Holy Land, Palestine is not, and can never become, a land which 
any race or religion can justly claim as its very own.17 
 
Through this recommendation, the Committee stressed the importance of calling 
off any claims either side had for dominating the land, which could only result in war. The 
report argued that the “Jews have a historic connection with the country,” yet, “Palestine is 
not, and never can be, a purely Jewish land. It lies at the crossroads of the Arab world. Its 
Arab population, descended from long-time inhabitants of the area, rightly look upon 
Palestine as their homeland.” And so the third recommendation concluded: “It is therefore 
neither just nor practicable that Palestine should become either an Arab State, in which an 
Arab majority could control the destiny of a Jewish minority, or a Jewish state, in which a 
Jewish majority would control that of an Arab minority. In neither case would minority 
guarantees afford adequate protection for the subordinated group.”18  
                                                 
16 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Report to the United States Government and His Majesty’s 
Government in the United Kingdom, Lausanne, Switzerland, April 20, 1946, p. 2.  
17 Ibid., p. 4. 
 
18 Ibid.  
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The report quoted a Palestinian-Jew as saying that in the hearts of the Jews there 
has always been a fear that some day Palestine would be turned into an Arab State and the 
Arabs would rule over the Jews. “This fear has at times reached the proportions of terror.” 
But now he recognised this same feeling of fear had started up in the hearts of the Arabs, 
“fear lest the Jews acquire the ascendancy and rule over them.”19 And so the Committee 
recommended that Palestine be established as, 
A country in which the legitimate national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs 
can be reconciled… In our view this cannot be done under any form of 
constitution in which a mere numerical majority is decisive, since it is precisely 
the struggle for a numerical majority which bedevils Arab-Jewish relations. To 
ensure genuine self-government for both the Arabs and the Jewish communities, 
this struggle must be made purposeless by the constitution itself.20 
 
The “constitution” the report was referring to was one that would be approved by a 
combination of the United Nations Trusteeship and British Mandate that would rule over 
Palestine, until some time when both Arabs and Jews could co-exist together.  
What brought the Committee to this conclusion? Why did they refrain from 
recommending partition of Palestine into a Jewish and Arab State, as the 1937 Peel 
Commission had?  What made them realise the differences between Jewish needs and 
Jewish interests? It was their travels to, and encounters with, those Jews who were left 
behind, while their loved ones perished in Europe that most influenced their conclusions. 
Their interviews with Holocaust survivors played the decisive role in convincing the 
Committee to differentiate between the need to cling to an ideology for survival, and the 
danger of its practice. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid., pp. 4-5.  
 
20 Ibid.  
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Zionism and the Displaced Persons’ Camps  
Following their hearings in Washington, DC, and London, the Committee travelled 
to Eastern Europe, and conducted its investigation in DP camps, where Jewish survivors 
were waiting for solutions to their situation. The Committee noticed immediately the 
influence of the Zionist ideology on the camps inhabitants. The idea of Zionism was 
extremely attractive to the Jewish survivors in the DP camps, for many reasons: It offered 
hope and motivation, suggested meaning to the death of their loved ones, and provided 
meaning for their own survival. They needed the ideology of Zionism to lift them up from 
a place they have been laying for too long; it was simply a question of survival. Edward 
Shils explains why ideologies are so important to some: 
[The] need for an ideology is the intensification of the need for a cognitive and 
moral map of the universe… An ideology arises because there is a strongly felt 
need for an explanation of important experiences which the prevailing outlook does 
not explain, because there is a need for firm guidance of conduct which similarly, 
is not provided by the prevailing outlook, and because there is a need, likewise 
strongly felt, for a fundamental vindication and legitimating of the value and 
dignity of the persons in question.21 
 
Mankowitz argues that for Holocaust survivors, Zionism stood for warmth, 
unquestioning acceptance and security of home; and for the more politically minded, it 
signified the only real hope for the rescue and rehabilitation of the little that remained of 
European Jewry, and in the long term, a promise of the Jewish future. Zionism thus was a 
shared effort to bring order into the survivors’ disrupted lives, to make sense of what had 
befallen them and to find a way of moving forward. In the debilitating context of the 
survivors’ lives, they desperately needed to restore their sense of human worth which had 
                                                 
21 Cited in Mankowitz, Life between Memory and Hope: The Survivors of the Holocaust in Occupied 
Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 69.  
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been so mercilessly trampled by the Nazis. “Their Zionism was an attempt to reconstruct 
their chaotic lives, a bid for meaning and dignity.”22 
If an ideology was needed to “rescue” the survivors, why then was it Zionism? 
Why not Communism, or Socialism, or religious Orthodoxy? Historian Koppel Pinson 
explains that the events of 1939-1945 seemed to discredit completely those philosophies of 
Jewish life prevailing before the war, which were not centred on Palestine. The Zionists 
were the only ones who had a program that seemed to make sense after the Holocaust. The 
Zionists were organised, active, and militant. Prospects for immigration to Palestine in the 
earlier period seemed more imminent, and without the prospect of emigration to Palestine 
there seemed to be no future for them. “Anti-Zionism or even a neutral attitude towards 
Zionism came to mean for them a threat to the most fundamental stakes in their future.”23 
The idea of Zionism, therefore, was a life-line greatly needed by Jewish DP camp 
inhabitants. 
“It is one thing to read in the newspaper the story of the deliberate murder of six 
million people,” writes Bartley C. Crum, an American member of the Committee, “it is 
another to meet the survivors.”24 Crum, like the rest of the Committee members, was 
deeply shaken by meeting Holocaust survivors while travelling in Europe. He recalls a 
man he met who showed him a photo of a pleasant-faced young woman holding a baby, 
                                                 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid., p. 70.  
 
24 Crum, Bartley C. Behind the Silken Curtain – A Personal Account of Anglo-American Diplomacy 
and the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1947), p. 79. In 1945, Bartley C. Crum was a very 
successful 45 year-old corporate lawyer in San-Francisco. Born in Sacramento, he received his 
Bachelor’s degree in jurisprudence in 1922 from the University of California at Berkeley, and entered 
private practice two years later. Known as a “republican liberal,” Crum became in 1940 the West Coast 
campaign manager of the Republican Party for Wendell Willkie. By 1941, Crum was the West Coast 
chairman of “Fight for Freedom,” a group favouring American intervention in WWII. And In 1944, he 
became the national chairman of the breakaway independent Republican ticket for Roosevelt, due to 
the weak stand, in Crum’s opinion, Dewey showed in foreign affairs. Crum opposed American policy 
towards Franco, and had volunteered to join a panel of lawyers to defend two Spanish anti-Fascists, but 
withdrew his assistance when he was called upon to serve on the Committee in 1945 (Podet, 
1986:112). 
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with another child by her side. “This is my wife and children,” said the man. “They killed 
the baby with a bayonet and she and the child were burned in the crematorium.”25 The 
man’s voice did not change from introducing the photo to what occurred to his family. 
“The Nazi’s purpose was to kill life, and kill the desire for life for those temporarily 
spared, by making each survivor realise that he or she alone was alive of their family,” 
writes Crum. Committee members were able to see first hand the psychological harm 
which the survivors were suffering, and their desperate need for something to cling to. 
When the Committee visited the DP camps, the British were aware that the Zionist 
leadership had sent special delegations from Palestine to Europe to instil the idea of 
Zionism within the Jewish DP camps inhabitants, and to prepare them for the practice of 
Zionism once in Palestine.26 In The Jewish Emergence from Powerlessness (1979), Bauer 
argues that it was due to Jewish-Palestinian units within the British army, and through 
shlichim (messengers) who worked in the illegal immigration program, that the Jewish DP 
camp inmates were influenced to desire Palestine as their destination. “The Jewish units 
[within the British army]… discovered Holocaust survivors in the liberated concentration 
camps of Austria and south Germany in June 1945. Their influence on the survivors was 
tremendous – with their Jewish insignia they inspired confidence and self-assurance 
among people whom the Nazi had tried to dehumanize for years.”27 It was under the 
influence of Palestinian-Jews and rabbis who served as chaplains in the US army, that the 
survivors organised as a group and identified with the struggle of a Jewish state, writes 
Bauer.  
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Kochavi, Arieh J. Post-Holocaust Politics – Britain, the United States, and Jewish Refugees, 1945-
1948 (Chapel Hill, NC & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 107. 
 
27 Bauer, Yehuda. The Jewish Emergence from Powerlessness (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1979), pp. 71-72.  
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But when the Committee members visited the DP camps the strong influence of 
Zionism did not matter to them, at least not then, as Crossman recalled: “They [the 
Committee members] had smelled the unique and unforgettable smell of huddled, 
homeless humanity.” The Committee members understood for the first time what it meant 
to be isolated survivors of a family deported to a Nazi concentration camp or slave labour. 
The whole abstract argument at this stage about Zionism and a Jewish state seemed very 
remote while they witnessed such human degradation. It was only then that the Committee 
could really appreciate the “patient impatience” of the witnesses in Washington and 
London who had tried to so hard to explain to the Committee what had happened in 
Eastern Europe.28 
When the Committee conducted its hearing in Zeilsheim, a DP camp near 
Frankfurt, the sound of marching came to their ears. Men and women, still wearing their 
striped uniforms, marched, three and four abreast, towards them. They were holding signs 
that read: “Open the Gates of Palestine.” While the Committee continued with their 
hearings, the men and women persisted in standing outside, at attention, while the rain was 
beating on their heads. Sir Fredrick W. Legget, a British member of the Committee, asked 
a United National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) official if those men 
and women were Zionists.29 “It is impossible to organize this camp along any line without 
accepting that fact,” the official replied. “If you organise a boys’ club to read, to talk, to 
                                                 
28 Ibid.  
 
29 Sir Fredrick W. Legget was 61 years old during the Committee’s investigation. He began working 
for the British government as a parliamentary civil servant from the age of 20, and was a skilled 
mediator. His positions included: Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Services of the Board of Trade 
(1915), and to the Minister of Labor (1917); Assistant Secretary of the Minister of Labor (1919); 
Principle Assistant Secretary (1931); and Undersecretary and Chief Advisor on Industrial Relations to 
the Ministry (1940-1942). As Chairman of the International Labor Office Joint Maritime Commission, 
he was responsible for drafting in 1942 the Seaman’s Chart for all nations. In 1945, Sir Legget became 
a member of the British Reparations Mission to Moscow. Sir Legget remarked that “you cannot force a 
solution to any dispute; solution is a matter of patience until the moment comes when incompatibles 
can be reconciled.” His mediation skills were the reason he was chosen to serve on the Committee 
(Podet, 1986:89-90).  
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debate, to conduct dances, at the second meeting it turns out to be reading Zionist books, 
debating Zionist problems, and dancing the Hora.”30 Zionist officials were organising and 
preparing the survivors for their future life. 
Crossman observed that the morale among the survivors was always higher in the 
centres where a Kibbutz (a group of community training itself for the new life in Palestine) 
had been organised. “The Kibbutzim were a moving spectacle,” remarked Crossman. “In 
an environment of utter hopelessness, the Zionist faith expressed itself in self-organization 
and self-discipline. Their own civilization and communal life as Jews had been utterly 
destroyed. Their homes, their synagogues, their libraries, everything had perished.”31 But 
at the camps holding the survivors, a new community was growing up “in anticipation of 
the new life in Palestine.” To destroy the Kibbutz (and in that sense Zionism), argued 
Crossman, would be to break the only values which prevented these people from 
degenerating, “as many in the concentration camps had degenerated, into subhuman 
beastliness.”32 The preparation of the survivors for a life in Palestine, where they believed 
they would be free, was enough to lift them from their hours of despair. When noone else 
seemed to care, Zionism and Zionists were there.  
Sir Legget wondered if Zionism was not just another form of Nazism, as he was 
unsure if people had the right to voice alternative views. “Isn’t it the case that the Zionist 
elements suppress any minority feelings?” The Camp Director assured him that everyone 
was free to express their views without harm, but Sir Legget seemed unconvinced. “It 
strikes me as dreadful that there seems to be no way to make these people realise the 
                                                 
30 Crum, Bartley C. Behind the Silken Curtain – A Personal Account of Anglo-American Diplomacy 
and the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1947) , p 86.  
31 Crossman, Richard, MP. Palestine Mission – A Personal Record (New York & London: Harper & 
Brothers Publishers, 1947), p. 81. 
 
32 Ibid., p. 82.  
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limitations of Palestine. There is such bitter disappointment ahead for some of them.”33 In 
a poll that was conducted in the Zeilsheim DP camp, of 18,311 people, 13 said they 
wished to stay in Europe, and 17,712 wished to go to Palestine.34 In another poll, the 
survivors were asked to put down a second choice, other than Palestine. Hundreds wrote 
“Crematorium.”35 The Jewish survivors were desperate to get out of the camps, but were 
they truly Zionists wishing to immigrate to Palestine or did they simply opt for Palestine as 
there was nowhere else to go? The answers to this question are mixed. 
Samuel Gringauz, a Holocaust survivor, who wrote extensively on the surviving 
Jews in the DP camps, referred to Zionism in the camps: “Everything we do is done under 
the shadow cast by our holy dead. Neither the inhabitants of Landsberg nor those in 
Feldafing give us our marching orders. We are commanded by the millions of our fallen 
martyrs.”36 Gringauz then argues that many survivors saw Zionism as a way to give 
meaning to the catastrophe.  Mankowitz confirms in Life between Memory and Hope 
(2002) that the agony of the innocent dead served as the collective conscience of the 
survivors, their last will and testament constituted a categorical imperative that demanded 
implicit loyalty. “The primary duty of those who remained alive was to continue their lives 
as Jews so as to endow those who died with symbolic perpetuity and to serve, thereby, as 
their ‘living monument.’”37 Thus, it seems from both Gringauz’s and Mankowitz’s 
perspective, that Zionism was a form of commemoration.  The survivors needed to find a 
way to make sense of what befell them, and practicing an ideology that promised safety for 
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34 Ibid., p. 85.  
 
35 Ibid., p 90. 
36 Cited in Mankowitz, Zeev, W. Life between Memory and Hope: The Survivors of the Holocaust in 
Occupied Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 79.  
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Jews world-wide seemed to make sense to them. Immigration to Palestine and the creation 
of a Jewish State therefore was a method of making sense of the Holocaust.  
Young children, especially, needed to make sense of their world. In the town of 
Villach, high up between the Yugoslav and Italian frontiers, was another DP camp. The 
“policeman” of the camp was a sixteen year old Polish boy who had spent his last six years 
in concentration camps. Crossman asked the boy about any relatives he may have in 
America. He answered that his mother lived there. Crossman asked if he was in contact 
with her. “I have cut her off,” replied the boy, “root and branch. She had betrayed the 
destiny of my nation. She has sold out to the Goys. She ran away to America. It is the 
destiny of my nation to be the lords of Palestine.”38 Crossman asked him how he knew this 
was their destiny. “It is written in the Balfour Declaration,” was the response.  
In another incident, Crum engaged with a man in the camp on the political situation 
in Palestine and the idea of a Jewish state. “Why do you wish a Jewish state?” asked 
Crum. “What kind of a question is that?” replied the man. “The Americans have America. 
The English have England. The French have France. We want a Jewish state. Palestine is 
the only state we can order our own existence. If you tell me we are not Jews, but Germans 
or Poles or Austrians, I give you the testimony of six million dead.” To this Crum asked if 
he realised there were Arabs in Palestine and that Jews will have to get along with them. 
“If outsiders will not disturb us, we will get along with the Arabs…” answered the man. 
When Crum asked the survivor whether he thought it “democratic to impose a new 
majority on an Arab majority already there?” the man’s response suggested a clear lack of 
knowledge on Palestine and its inhabitants. “The Arabs have possessed this land for 
centuries. They have let it become a desert. It has no value for them…”39 
                                                 
38 Crossman, Richard, MP. Palestine Mission – A Personal Record (New York & London: Harper & 
Brothers Publishers, 1947), p. 80 
39 Crum, Bartley C. Behind the Silken Curtain – A Personal Account of Anglo-American Diplomacy 
and the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1947), pp. 87-88. 
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What if other states opened their arms to Jewish immigration? What would the 
survivors then do? Grossman suggests that had the doors to the US been opened earlier, 
the pressure of large-scale emigration to Palestine might have eased significantly. Due to 
immigration obstacles, few Jewish survivors were admitted to the US before the 1948 and 
1950 immigration reforms. “This assured that the number of Jews demanding entry to 
Palestine kept growing…”40 Ironically, the Zionist project of emigration to Palestine, 
conducted by Zionist leaders within Palestine, and the US interest in limiting immigration 
into its own territory, went hand-in-hand. As an American official wrote, “the evacuation 
of the Jews of Germany and Austria to Palestine will solve the problem of the individuals 
involved and will also remove a problem from the military authorities who have had to 
deal with it [i.e. the problem of finding a place for the survivors to go to].”41  
Although the majority of the survivors in the DP camps were voicing their desire to 
go to Palestine, believing it was the only real option open to them, the names survivors had 
bestowed on the camps’ streets showed that many of them desired to go to the US. These 
names included Independence Square, Pennsylvania Avenue, and Franklin Roosevelt. In 
Fohrenwald’s DP camp, streets were named New York, Michigan, and Wisconsin 
Avenue.42 Based on the street names, one may conclude that many survivors had a not-so-
secret desire to immigrate to the US, any yet, as it did not seem realistic to them, Palestine 
was the best option. And so they focused on what seemed practical, real, and achievable. 
The Committee, like later historians, understood that Zionist ideology was very 
popular with the survivors in the DP camp, as it offered them a solution when no other 
idea and no-one else did. In many ways Zionism was saviour to Holocaust survivors, 
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emotionally, mentally, and physically. A witness to the Committee, who was in charge of 
vocational re-education, explained that only the Zionist goal could make the survivors 
work. Because they had done such inhumanly hard labour for the Nazis, it was only 
Zionism that could change their negative attitude towards work into a positive one. “I, 
myself,” said the witness “would never have wanted to do a day’s work again in my life if 
I were not imbued with the ideal of Palestine.”43 
Dr. Zalman Grinberg, chairman of the Central Committee of Liberated Jews in 
Munich, supported the notion that the idea of Zionism was a life saviour for the surviving 
Jews of the camps. “You must understand the psychological factors. The Nazi SS 
education of work was something that took from the Jew the love to work – because work 
meant death. Twelve hours of work a day under malnutrition meant death.”44 Dr. Zalman 
was a strong advocate for the re-education of Jewish love for work, which he argued, 
could only happen in Palestine.  It was only possible there, because of the existence of two 
factors “absolutely indispensable for such re-education”: The love and comfort of the 
Jewish people; and the strength of conviction, the discipline of work. “The Jewish 
population in Palestine has the moral quality to re-educate our people in making them feel 
that they are working for themselves, for their families, for the future.”45 All this was what 
the survivors, not only wanted, but also deserved, after what they had been through. Love, 
affection, and warmth from those “just like them” were what they aimed for. The idea of 
Zionism promised them all that. 
However, the opinion of professionals of the American Jewish Joint Distribution 
Committee (JDC) was different when it involved the spread of militant Zionism to youth 
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who had lost their homes and families.46 Although they were able to see the need of 
survivors for an ideology, they feared its impact. The JDC argued that although Zionism 
gave meaning to disrupted lives, the JDC mistrusted the indoctrination of damaged minds 
in political kibbutzim, where children bonded with Madrichim (leaders) not much older 
than themselves, “filled with partisan zeal but not attuned to the psychology (or 
educational) needs of their charges.”47 The JDC worried that the single-mindedness of the 
Zionist message limited the range of material taught, and feared that the youngsters, who 
had lost so much already, were being set up for further “cruel disappointment” if their goal 
was not achieved. As Grossman argues,  
Indeed, JDC social workers complained, Zionist passions, verging on the 
‘totalitarian’ imposition of ‘disciplined unity,’ disrupted family reunification 
programs and harshly penalized children who wanted to leave youth groups and 
camp life to join relatives abroad or who simply did not want to join the Zionist 
future for which they were being trained.48 
 
 
Although the Zionist activists’ aim was to meet the needs of the survivors, they 
were in fact confusing the survivors’ needs with the interest of Zionism – the 
establishment of a Jewish state. The Zionist activists were directly or indirectly infringing 
on the rights of individual survivors to meet their needs both by not offering alternatives to 
Zionism, and by discouraging those who were attempting to seek them. Would the sixteen 
year-old Polish boy Crossman met in Villach be so adamant not to join his mother in the 
US, had he been allowed to think outside the “box” of Zionism?  
                                                 
46 The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee is a relief agency. Its mission statement reads: 
“Since 1914, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc. (JDC) has served as the overseas 
arm of the American Jewish community. Our mission is to serve the needs of Jews throughout the 
world, particularly where their lives as Jews are threatened or made more difficult. We sponsor 
programs of relief, rescue and renewal and help Israel address its most urgent social challenges. We are 
committed to the idea that all Jews are responsible for one another” 
[http://www.jdc.org/who_mission.html) 
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The idea of “Palestine” for the Jewish survivors became a magic world, a place 
they believed they could live freely, a place they could conduct their lives as they wished. 
Whether or not the Jewish Holocaust survivors wanted to go specifically to Palestine – 
meaning the region in the Middle East or to “Palestine” – any place which would allow 
Jews to be free – is debatable. What was not debatable was the desire of Zionist leaders, 
within Palestine, that these survivors come to Palestine. Bauer writes that the Zionist 
leadership feared that a large proportion of the many tens of thousands of Jews 
concentrated in the DP camps in Germany and Austria would seek to reach countries other 
than Palestine, because at the time, the gates of Palestine were not open. In fact, by 1945, 
many survivors opted for Western countries; this of course, endangered the Zionist 
aspiration of creating a majority in Palestine, and thus justifying the creation of a Jewish 
state.49 It was therefore necessary for the Zionist leadership to provide a “helping hand” in 
increasing the pressure put on the forces in Europe to allow Jews in the camps to 
immigrate to Palestine. 
From 1945 to 1948, no more than 12,000 Jewish DP camp inmates entered the US, 
due to restrictions on Jewish immigration. Opportunities for these people to emigrate to 
Britain, South Africa, and Australia were also very limited. Assimilation among Germans 
or Eastern Europeans was not psychologically possible for the Jewish survivors. The 
closed borders by many countries, especially those of the US, would explain Crossman’s 
frustration at American calls for a Jewish state in Palestine. 50 “By shouting for a Jewish 
state, Americans satisfy many motives. They are attacking the Empire and the British 
imperialism, they are espousing a moral cause, the fulfilment for which they will take no 
responsibility, and most important of all, they are diverting attention from the fact that 
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their own immigration laws are the causes of one of the problems.”51 While the American 
government wanted a solution for the DP camps inhabitants, it did not want to be part of 
the solution, and so it saw Palestine as the only answer. 
The American need for a solution to the Jewish DP camp inhabitants’ problem, and 
American lack of desire to allow Jewish survivors into its own borders, allowed the Zionist 
leadership in Palestine to create pressure on the US to allow Jewish immigration into 
Palestine. When David Ben-Gurion visited Germany in October 1945, he met with General 
Eisenhower. Ben-Gurion made several demands after his meeting, the main one being that 
the Jewish survivors in Eastern Europe be allowed to enter American zones of occupation 
and be granted the status of displaced persons. Ben-Gurion explained this demand in a 
report to the Jewish Agency on November 21, 1945:52 “If we succeed in concentrating a 
quarter of a million Jews in the American zone, it will increase the American pressure [on 
the British]. Not because of the financial aspects of the problem – that does not matter to 
them – but because they see no future for these people outside Eretz-Yisrael.”53 It seems 
then, that the fact other countries did not allow Jewish survivors into their borders, worked 
to the benefit of Zionism, and Ben-Gurion knew how to exploit the situation, either for the 
benefit of the survivors, for the establishment of a Jewish state, or both. A pool of potential 
immigrants to Palestine was formed under American auspices.54  
There was a great desire by all parties concerned – the Jewish holocaust survivors, 
the bodies in charge of the DP camps, the military forces occupying Europe, the Zionist 
leaders within and out of Palestine - to find solutions for the survivors of Nazi persecution. 
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It is debateable whether or not the majority of the Jewish survivors in the DP camps were 
truly Zionists, or whether they simply supported an idea that would provide them with a 
solution to their suffering. The fact remained that most countries around the world closed 
their gates to the Jewish people. Could Palestine be a solution for their plight? Would a 
Jewish state really be required? Zionist leaders thought it was, regardless of whether it met 
the needs of the Jewish people. 
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A Jewish-Controlled Palestine  
Through its hearings, the Committee was attempting to understand how Zionist 
leaders’ interest in a Jewish state, in all of Palestine, met the needs of the Jewish Holocaust 
survivors and the Jewish people in general. By doing so, they tried to make sense of 
Zionism’s ability to provide what the Holocaust survivors, now followers of Zionism, must 
have to have a peaceful and prosperous life. The Committee became frustrated in its 
efforts to understand the needs versus the interests of the Jewish people, as shown in these 
exchanges between Committee member Judge Joseph Chappell Hutcheson, Jr.55 and 
Nathan Jackson, representing the Jewish Social Labour Party, Poale Zion, in London:56 
 
Judge Hutcheson: You drew a parallel which I didn’t exactly understand. You said that 
just as Britain is a British state, and France is a French state – in the first place I 
don’t exactly understand what you mean by Britain being a British state. You mean 
England and Scotland? Is that what you are talking about? 
                                                 
55 Judge Joseph Chappell Hutcheson, Jr. was 66 years old at the time of the inquiry. Born in Houston, 
Taxes, he was a son of a Confederate captain and pioneer statesman. He was educated at Virginia and 
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Jackson: I mean there are in this country all kind of national groups, English, Scotch, 
Welsh. The state is British. There isn’t such a person as British, unless he takes 
[deleted] genetically when he goes to Europe. 
Judge Hutcheson: This isn’t a British, Scotch, or Welsh state. Why then in Palestine 
should we have a Jewish state? Why don’t you have a Palestinian state? 
Jackson: Because the position of the Jew in the world is such that for all the reasons I have 
given both in the memorandum and my preliminary remarks, it is necessary that 
they have control of their own destiny as a people. May I define their point of 
view? It has been defined I think.  
Judge Hutcheson: Many, many times, but you may have a different variation of it.  
Jackson: They are people wanting to be themselves, that is all.  
Judge Hutcheson: Why don’t the Scottish… be themselves and shove the English out? ... 
What I am trying to draw out is this: While I am of Scottish descent, in America we 
don’t want a Scottish state and the English don’t want an English state. Why, in 
your opinion, does the Jew want to have a Jewish state? 
Jackson: It is not the name, sir; it is the condition. The words are only an expression of 
something that we mean. It is the condition of what is contained in the Jewish state. 
We mean, as I said, Jewish immigration, free Jewish colonization and land 
settlement, some control by the Jews of fiscal policy in order to make this thing a 
policy, because they can’t depend forever on contributions from American and 
British Jews. Thirdly, if you grant them these things, they have certain state 
functions, state powers, governmental powers. That automatically becomes a 
Jewish state, whether you call it that or not.  
Judge Hutcheson: The trouble with me is how people calling themselves Jews or Scotch or 
Germans or whatnot can expect to come into a land which they do not populate in 
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anything like the majority, in fact, it was a very small minority and demand that 
their characteristics and their point of view shall be enforced upon others.  
 
Judge Hutcheson’s frustration stems from his inability to see why the Jewish 
people are any different from those who are not Jewish; why do the Jewish people deserve 
rights that no other people have? Jackson was arguing that the Jewish people needed a 
state in order to secure a peaceful existence and be prosperous, while Judge Hutcheson 
only saw that requirement as an interest, something the Jewish people really wanted, but 
not something they must have to fulfil their desired prosperity. While all other nations, 
religions, or ethnicities in Western Europe and in North America were able to have their 
rights protected without having a state reserved purely for them, Judge Hutcheson did not 
seem convinced by Jackson’s argument that the Jewish people were an exception.  
One could argue that Holocaust survivors, Jews and non-Jews alike, should have 
received privileges not granted to others, simply based on their suffering. But granting a 
privilege to the entire Jewish population, no matter if they were or were not Holocaust 
survivors, was difficult for some Committee members to grasp. Wilfred F. Crick, a British 
member of the Committee, was trying to clarify a previous remark made by Jackson on 
this subject:57 
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demography and financing, and only asked questions regarding national histories to clear up points, as 
illustrated above (Podet, 1986:91).  
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Crick: I want to make quite sure I heard right in one of your remarks in your principle 
statement. Mr. Jackson, you said at one stage that any Jew – anyone who considers 
himself a Jew – who wishes to go to Palestine, should be at liberty to go there. 
Jackson: Certainly. 
Crick: Have you in mind particularly the dispossessed, displaced, stateless Jews, or all 
Jews? 
Jackson: Particularly, as a matter of urgency, these people ought to go first, but any Jew 
wherever he may be.  
Crick: That should apply to a Jew like yourself, who is a British citizen or a Jew who is an 
American citizen? 
Jackson: Yes, sir.  
Crick: And you went on to say – and here I’m a little doubtful whether I heard you 
correctly, so put me right if I’m wrong – that any Jew who did not go to Palestine 
should be free to go where he wanted to go and helped to do so.  
Jackson: I was referring particularly to those Jews in Europe who need to go somewhere.  
Crick: I thought you were. In other words, you want to give all Jews the right to go to 
Palestine and the European displaced Jews the right to go anywhere they like? 
Jackson: Yes, sir, if that were possible 
 
What Jackson thus asked the Committee to recommend was that all Jews have the 
ability and the right - whether they suffered from persecution or not - to immigrate to 
another country, that being Palestine. This type of right was not granted to any other 
people. Judge Hutcheson was still confused as to the rights Jackson assigned to all Jews, 
not only to the Holocaust survivors. As far as Judge Hutcheson was concerned, he had no 
other country, and he had no access to other countries, except to the US. Why then, he 
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asked Jackson, should the Jewish people have the right to go to the US temporarily and 
then go to Palestine? “Why should this sort of a double nationality be afforded to one 
people?” Judge Hutcheson asked. Jackson replied that this was not double nationality, that 
the Jews had only one nationality and one state. Crossman then interrupted and asked 
which the nationality was? “Jewish,” replied Jackson. “Would you say the American-Jew 
is not an American?” asked Crossman. To this Jackson replied that the Jews in the US are 
American citizens, just like the Swedes, Irish, Greeks, and Poles were citizens of the US. 
“You don’t think there is an American nation to which he [the Jew] belongs?” asked 
Crossman. “I believe that it is in the process of creation, in which the Jews will also take 
their part,” replied Jackson. At this point the Committee broke out in laughter.58 
It was clear from this exchange that the Committee were irritated at not grasping 
why Jews not only required different a treatment from others, but in fact that the Jewish 
people felt and believed themselves to be different. Crossman’s recollection of this 
exchange is of frustration. “Any Gentile, who is compelled to study Zionism for weeks on 
end, reached a point where he feels inclined to bang on the table and walk out of the 
room.”59 Arab nationalism was much more intransigent than Zionism, argued Crossman. 
“Yet we didn’t feel the same peculiar exasperation in studying it or in our discussions with 
the Arab leaders.” Crossman writes that the Committee never expected the Arab to be 
other than an Arab, yet the Zionists they interrogated in London and Washington were 
British and American citizens. “We expected them to behave like us and to accept our 
basic principles. When they failed to do so and obstinately put forward their own 
philosophy, we felt annoyed with them for being non-English and non-American.” But 
when other Jews attacked the Zionists and asserted they were just British Jews and 
American Jews, the Committee felt “acutely embarrassed:” “I could understand a Jew who 
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has given up Judaism and become an ordinary citizen just like myself. I could understand a 
Jew who had chosen to join his own people in Palestine. Who exactly were these people 
who claimed to be both Jews and English-men and disagreed violently on the issue of 
whether there was a Jewish nation or not?” remarked Crossman in his diary.60 What 
Crossman and the rest of the Committee were attempting to do was to put themselves in 
the shoes of those they were questioning, but the line of logic their Zionist witnesses 
expressed did not fit easily in the minds of the Committee members. Some Committee 
members could not comprehend the idea that one could be Jewish, but not support 
Zionism; that a person could have a Jewish identity, be a citizen of a European or a north-
American country, but oppose the creation of a Jewish state. This idea simply did not fit in 
into any of the “boxes” they had established in their heads. It was a shade of grey, rather 
than a definite black or white.  
“This is the very centre of the Jewish problem,” writes Crossman, “in a world of 
nation-states the Jew is in a false position.” If the Jewish people try to retain their religion 
but take on the protective “colour of assimilation,” they over-compensate for the 
difference which separates them from their fellow citizens and often become “a caricature 
of the Englishman or the American.” But if they recognise their own separateness, they are 
driven to demand a “Jewish commonwealth” in which Jews are nationally Jewish. 
Crossman believed that “nationalism is the air which we breathe, and a separate Jewish 
people, if it is to survive, must become a nation.”61  But Crossman did not mean that a 
nation in fact meant a State, as the Zionist leaders would argue, a nation was not 
something synthetic which can be constructed by social engineering in any convenient 
piece of empty land. Jews who felt themselves part of the Jewish nation do so because of 
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their awareness of Jewish history. That is why the traditional religious longing to return to 
Zion has been transformed, in the atmosphere of the twentieth-century politics, into a 
political movement for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. “To blame Zionists for 
their nationalism is to demand that the Jews should feel differently, as a people, from 
every other people in the world.”62 What other alternatives did they have in the twentieth 
century? There were none. Zionism was simply following the rules established by other 
nations. The only problem was that a different nationality was being formed on the same 
land Zionism wanted to be unique – by the Palestinian-Arabs.  
But Zionism had another element – The Holocaust. Crossman remarked also that 
“in our age, the choice for the Jew is between Zionism or ceasing to be a Jew. That is the 
new situation which has finally been brought about by the Nazi persecution.”63 Was 
Crossman referring to all Jews, or to just European Jews who were victims of the 
Holocaust? What about Jews in northern Africa and the Middle East? Was Zionism really 
that relevant to the continuation of their Jewish lives?  
In fact, it was Crossman himself who answered this question, while contradicting 
his own argument. When talking about Arab opposition to Zionism, Crossman backed 
Azzam Pasha of the Arab League, who argued that the opposition to Zionism had nothing 
to do with anti-Semitism. During the Committee’s stay in Egypt, they had hoped to hear 
representatives of the Egyptian-Jewish community, which numbered some hundred 
thousand.  But they did not dare to appear publicly. “I met one or two of them privately at 
a friend’s house. Sleek and extremely prosperous businessmen, they were bitterly hostile 
to Zionism and blamed it for their increasing unpopularity with the Egyptians.” The 
Egyptian-Jews blamed Zionism for making extensive inroads on Egyptian Jewry, and the 
non-Zionists found themselves compelled to undertake counter-propaganda against it. “We 
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were to find similar conflicts among the Jewish communities in all the Arab countries.”64 
The Jews in Arab countries did not require Zionism to meet their needs for a secure and 
safe life. In fact, Zionism increased their vulnerability, because Zionism preached for a 
state where other Arabs lived.  
When Dr. Chaim Weizmann, representing the Jewish Agency, sat in front of the 
Committee, he was questioned about having a state that was aimed at only one people, and 
named after only one people, when there were two people living on the same land. 
Weizmann strongly believed that a state dedicated, supported, and run by the Jews, even in 
an area with Arabs, would meet Jewish needs for survival. The Committee did not seem 
convinced:65 
 
Crum: Do you think the word “Jewish” is necessary, and if so, why? 
Weizmann: If you would tell me, you are bringing in Jews. 
Crum: What is in my mind is this: You have presently an Arab majority in Palestine… The 
word “Jewish State” presently implies, does it not, the imposition of a new 
majority upon an existing majority of people, isn’t that right? [Emphasis 
added]. 
Weizmann: That is so, yes.  
Crum: What I would like to know is how that is justifies in democratic practice? 
Weizmann: The word “imposition” always means the use of force. Well, if you bring Jews 
into the country and allow them to settle and allow the country to develop 
to its maximum, and absorb as many people as can be absorbed, a majority 
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would be created. I don’t believe it is undemocratic if it is done without 
hurting the others.  
Crum: May I read to you from a statement in Foreign Affairs in 1931. This is what is in 
my mind: It is a statement by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:  
            “Into the whole texture of Palestine life there comes the unflagging 
realisation that Arab cannot dominate Jew nor Jew Arab, and that only a 
fellowship of reciprocal rights and reciprocal duties can be realised the 
distinctive value to the civilisation of Jew and Arab.” 
Do you concur in that statement?  
Weizmann: I concur in that statement as far as the moral relationship between Arabs and 
Jews goes. If there is a future Jewish State, I believe the Arabs would have 
complete freedom of religion, culture, language, autonomy in their 
municipal organisations, and they would be able to express themselves as 
well as they can. It does not mean that we would like to dominate the Arabs 
in the sense of taking away their natural rights or their language or 
interfering in any way at all with their culture and their civilization… if you 
remember my chief statement, I would say I admit it implies a certain 
amount of injustice, but the question is the line of least injustice.  
 
 
Any ideology, including Zionism, looks at a conflict from a very specific angle, 
and thus looks at solutions to a conflict from that same particular angle. This tunnel vision, 
therefore, only allows solutions that fit within the spectrum of that ideology. As Weizmann 
was focused on the issue of Palestine through Zionist eyes, he was unable to see that a 
solution to a conflict does not necessarily need to have a certain injustice. But from his 
angle, in order to have a Jewish state on a land where Arabs sat, injustice must occur, 
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because he saw it as a simple black or white situation – either there is a Jewish state, or 
there is not. From his perspective, the idea of not having a Jewish state was unconceivable. 
The idea of sharing the land with the Arabs was not part of the Zionist ideology, and 
therefore not part of the list of solutions available.  
Crum noted that he had many difficulties with the term “Jewish state,” and shared 
Judge Hutcheson’s feeling that it suggested a narrow nationalism, which “many of us find 
abhorrent.” Weizmann nodded. “Yes,” he said, “we are forever explaining that. Surely the 
world does not think that the Jewish people, who have suffered so much from narrow 
nationalism, would themselves succumb to it?” 66  People who go through a trauma once, 
let alone numerous traumas for centuries, will in fact become defensive when those same 
traumatised people become a singular unit, in a single space. “Narrow nationalism” is 
always practiced by those who fear the worse, because they had suffered the worse – it is a 
defence mechanism, an instinctive mechanism to meet the needs of survival. Zionism was 
in fact an answer to “narrow nationalisms” of other states; it was simply the other side of 
the coin.67 
When Moshe Shertok (later to be known as Moshe Sharet, Israel’s second Prime 
Minister) was questioned, he was asked by Crossman to imagine trading places with a 
Palestinian-Arab. Crossman’s purpose was to see if a Zionist leader could see the conflict 
and its effects on the Arabs from a different perspective, a very different angle than 
Zionism. Were the needs of the Arabs any different than those of the Jews? Would the 
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Jews react any differently from the Arabs, if faced with the same dangers, the same 
obstacles to their secure future?68 
 
Crossman: …You told us how you were brought up in an Arab village. I want you to 
imagine, by a change to your nature you had grown up an Arab instead of a Jew. 
What would the Arab Shertok have thought of the remark of the Jewish Shertok, 
when he spoke of acquiring the soil foot by foot and turning it into Jewish soil…? 
Shertok: I can quite conceive his feeling uneasy about it.  
Crossman: Uneasy in your word? 
Shertok: We are speaking among statesmen. 
Crossman: Let us hear the truth. 
Shertok: I can quite conceive his being opposed to it; I would say strenuously opposed to 
it.  
Crossman: Can you conceive him leading a nationalist movement against the Jews here? 
Shertok: Most certainly. 
Crossman: You were telling us about the strenuous efforts at cooperating between Jews 
and Arabs. 
Shertok: Yes.  
Crossman: Do you think that particular description of the effort to acquire foot by foot and 
turning the soil into Jewish soil by purchase, that that is likely to create good 
relations between Jews and Arab? 
 
To this, Shertok attempted to delay his response, by emphasising that when the 
Jewish Agency spoke of cooperation between Jews and Arab, they spoke of Jews and 
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Arabs within Palestine, and that for a Jew to be in Palestine did not mean renting a room in 
Tel-Aviv. Crossman was not amused by Shertok’s delay tactic. 
 
Cossman: I am trying to get a straight answer. I asked whether or not you thought that a 
policy which can be summed up in the phrase “the soil acquired by purchase is 
really Jewish” would please Mr. Shertok who is Arab? 
Shertok: It would not. 
Crossman: And it might create racial strife? 
Shertok: It might. 
 
Crossman then insisted that Shertok put himself in the shoes of an Arab. 
 
Crossman: What about the Arab? Has he certain things he cannot give up – the other 
Shertok I am speaking about? 
Shertok: Yes. 
Crossman: What happens if the two things conflict? 
Shertok: Then there are certain criteria I tried to suggest.  
Crossman: What would the other Shertok think about these? I want you to think of 
yourself as an Arab for a change and think how he would judge it.  
Shertok: If the matter were only between the Jewish Shertok and what you are pleased to 
call the Arab Shertok, then this whole Committee would not have come into 
being…[the Committee would not be established, because the “Arab” and “Jewish 
Shertok” would have found a solution to the conflict]. 
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 Shertok was clearly uneasy at the line of questioning and even irritated by it, 
simply because the questions forced him to look outside the “box” of Zionism. When 
looking from the outside, it is difficult not to see the harm the Zionist ideology did and 
would cause the Arab population in Palestine; it is difficult not to see the harm that in turn 
this would cause the Jewish people, who would then have to defend themselves in 
response to the practice of their own ideology. 
 
Crossman: One last lighter question, you quoted the Book of Leviticus, much to my 
bewilderment, on the subject of the Jewish Agency’s purchase of land, saying 
“Thou shalt not sell for the land is mine.” 
Shertok: I was speaking of a social aspect.  
Crossman: Even Ben-Gurion did not elevate the Jewish Agency to that position, the land is 
mine. 
Shertok: I said the land should not be sold forever. 
Crossman: Because the land is Mine – Mine there is a Divine attribute… How does that 
apply to the Agency? 
Shertok: It applied this way. The principle is there laid down that the land shall not be sold 
forever because the land is God’s and I regard that as a spiritual, ethical if you will, 
justification of a policy of national ownership of land [emphasis added]. 
 
What Shertok illustrates above is the internal conflict between religion and politics 
which Zionism faced. Although Zionism was created as a secular-political ideology, it was 
based on strong religious roots. The purpose of Zionism is to return to Zion, the Land of 
Israel. Without the strong religious bond, Zionism cannot stand on it own. It is the Jewish 
connection to the land, both historical and religious, that is the base to the whole Zionist 
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claim to Palestine. Shertok understood that these religious connotations might not sit well 
with the Committee, and so he attempted at first to explain his words in a social manner, 
but religion had to become part of the equation, otherwise the Zionist claim has no basis. 
Perhaps the person who could least see the Arab perspective, the impact it would 
have on them, and in return, the impact it would have on the Jewish population in 
Palestine, was the leader of the Jewish Agency. In a memorandum sent to the Committee 
by the Jewish Agency, David Ben-Gurion compared the Jewish people returning to 
Palestine to people who were once kicked out of a home and were retuning. The metaphor 
was an attempt to show a historical connection of the Jews to the land, a historical 
justification to the practice of Zionism, and to show that not only will the Jewish 
immigrants returning home not hurt the Arabs, but in fact the Arabs may even benefit from 
the arrival of those returning home. “We are here as of right. We are not here on the 
strength of the Balfour Declaration or the Palestine Mandate. We were here long, long 
before,” Ben-Gurion proclaimed.69 To illustrate this, Ben-Gurion used the metaphor of a 
fifty-room house, comparing it to the Land of Israel. “We were expelled from that house, 
our family was scattered, somebody else took it away from us and again it changed hands 
many times, and then we had to come back and we found some five rooms occupied by 
other people, the other rooms destroyed and uninhabitable from neglect.” Ben-Gurion then 
explained to the Committee that the Jewish people’s desire was not only to share the 
“house,” but to assist the other occupants to improve their living quarters. “We do not 
want to remove you [the Arabs], please stay where you are, we are going back into the 
uninhabitable rooms, we will repair them.” But it seemed that the other occupants did not 
desire the presence of their new neighbours. “No, we [the Arabs] are here, we do not want 
you. We do not live in these rooms, they are no good for any human beings, but we do not 
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want you to repair them, to make them better.” Ben-Gurion again emphasised that he did 
not want the other occupants to leave. “You may stay, though you have only been here 
since yesterday. We are even willing to help you repair your rooms too, if you like; if not, 
you can do it yourself.” In this metaphor, there are other buildings in the area. “We do not 
say to them, ‘Please move over to that other big building.’ No, we say, ‘Please stay here, 
we shall be good neighbours.’ This is our case,” said Ben-Gurion, it is simple and 
compelling.” 
Ben-Gurion saw the conflict and the solution to it through the same Zionist lenses 
that Weizmann and Shertok did, though his lenses were thicker. While both Weismann and 
Shertok saw and admitted some negative impact on the Arabs, Ben-Gurion admitted none. 
In fact, he saw the Arabs as the invaders, rather than the Jews, and believed that as the 
Arabs let their own living quarters deteriorate, that it was up to the Jews returning home to 
elevate the residents’ standard of living. He tried to argue, unconvincingly, that the Jews 
would cause no harm to the Arab population, and his metaphor gave the impression that 
the Arabs were temporary residents in this “building,”  and that the Jews, now returning 
home, were graciously allowing the Arabs to stay, even though the house did not belong to 
the Arabs, as they only arrived “yesterday.” 
In 1947, the Arab House in London warned of the establishment of a Jewish state. 
It argued that if the Arabs of Palestine already felt their existence threatened while the 
Jewish national home was still in the making, how could they not fear if a Jewish state 
were to come into existence? The Arabs feared becoming a minority in a state that was 
meant to be exclusively Jewish, and not having adequate representation in Government. 
“The alarming development in the principles and methods of Jewish nationalism gave full 
cause for alarm; it is enough to mention the exclusion of Arabs from Jewish enterprises 
and the prohibition of their employment on Jewish land, the creation of an exclusive 
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Hebrew culture and the growth of terrorist and para-military organisations”70 The Arab 
Office warned that there was no doubt that these tendencies would continue if a Jewish 
state was established, as the first aim of the Jewish government would be to strengthen its 
hold on the land and the economic life of the country, to make it economically possible to 
bring hundreds of thousands of Jews and to turn Palestine is every way into something “as 
Jewish as England is English.” It also warned that the ever-increasing Arab population 
would find itself gradually squeezed off the land and out of employment, and would be 
faced with the alternative of leaving Palestine or becoming “a degraded urban and rural 
proletariat.”71 The testimonies of Weizmann, Shertok, and Ben-Gurion clearly illustrate 
that the Arab House was accurate in its fears. 
In his memoir, Crossman wrote of his thoughts on the Zionist plan to have a Jewish 
state, saying the more he thought about it the less acceptable it appeared.  
The Zionists protested against the White Paper because it laid down that Arabs of 
Palestine would always remain a majority. This they called unjust and 
undemocratic. How then could it be just and democratic to rescind the White Paper 
and announce a new policy which meant nothing less then deliberately turning the 
Arab majority into an Arab minority? 
 
Crossman argued that if the British allowed the Zionists to have control over 
immigration into Palestine, the British would be inciting the Arabs to revolt. “Year by 
year, month by month, they would watch their majority diminish as the immigrants 
streamed in. Any Arab leader worth his salt would go to war to stop such a process.” 
Crossman understood the mood of desperation out of which the Zionist program had risen, 
but he could not see how any government could accept it.72  He could not understand it 
because although the interests of the Jewish people of Palestine would be met, the needs of 
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the Arabs not to be ruled by the Jewish people would not. If the needs of the Arabs were 
not met, neither would the needs of the Jews – A safe and prosperous life. However, the 
Zionists leaders tried to convince the Committee that the Palestinian-Arabs’ needs for a 
prosperous life would be met by Jewish immigration, as the next section will illustrate. 
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Jewish Immigration & Arab Life in Palestine  
One of the many arguments put forward by the Zionist movement in support of 
immigration into Palestine, and the establishment of a Jewish state, claimed that the living 
conditions of the local Arab population would be improved.  The twentieth century was in 
its fifth decade, and it was quickly becoming a globalized era.73 Palestine, in the eyes of 
Jewish European immigrants, was lagging behind. Whether or not the local Arab 
population wanted to become part of this globalized time was never discussed, it was just 
assumed they did and that they lacked the means to become part of it. The Jewish Agency 
advocated that the practice of Zionism would meet the needs of the Arab population – a 
rise in their living standards using economical gains. But how could an ideology that 
advocated for the rights of Jews only, benefit non-Jews and those who were considered the 
obstacle to the realisation of Zionism? The truth is, that the Arabs did not and could not 
benefit from the practice of Zionism, but this did not stop the Jewish Agency from trying 
to convince the Committee that the Arabs would. 
In The Jewish Case (1947), the Jewish Agency laid down their case for the 
Committee. The Agency quoted Colonel T. E. Lawrence (also known as Lawrence of 
Arabia), an advocate for Arab rights in the Middle East, in an interview he gave to the 
press on November 28, 1919: “Speaking entirely as a non-Jew, I am decidedly if favour of 
Zionism. Indeed, I look on the Jews as the natural importers of that Western leaven which 
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is so necessary for countries of the Near East.”74 The Jewish Agency also referred to 
Robert Graves’ book, Lawrence and the Arabs, quoting Colonel Lawrence as saying: 
“Zionist success would enormously reinforce the material development of Arab Syria 
[which included Palestine] and Iraq.” By quoting a non-Jew, whose affection for the Arab 
population was well known, the Jewish Agency tried to convince the Committee that 
Zionism was also supported by non-Jews who saw its benefits.75  
The Jewish Agency also remarked on the study of Robert Nathan, a Washington 
economist, and chairman of the Central Planning Division of the War Production Board, 
who conducted a survey of the economic potential of Palestine in 1943-1944. His 
conclusion supported the Jewish Agency’s view, adding that “certain schemes of irrigation 
and resettlement propounded by American scientists and engineers would… expedite the 
economic resurgence of the Arabs of Palestine at a pace which cannot be envisaged if 
Jewish development proceeds at its present rate [arguing for an increase in Jewish 
immigration].”76  
Not only will Palestine benefit from Jewish immigration, argued the Jewish 
Agency, but the entire Middle East too, especially as the region was in economic despair. 
“This condition of economic depression is unlikely to improve under the influence of time, 
and the present rate of social and industrial development in the Arab world is inadequate to 
overtake the present tendency to deterioration.”77 The Jewish Agency thus argued that the 
economic revival in the Middle East depended upon three factors: scientific agriculture, 
industrialization, and adequate capital to finance rapid and bold developments. “Now these 
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three conditions, which any objective critic would accept as the pre-requisites of Middle 
Eastern prosperity, are precisely the characteristic contributions of Jewish effort to the 
Middle Eastern scene.”78 In the memorandum, the Jewish Agency used King Abdullah of 
Trans-Jordan to confirm their argument: “I was astonished at what I saw of the Jewish 
colonies when I travelled from Jenin to Lydda. The entire coast from Haifa to Jaffa is now 
in their hands. They have colonised the sand dunes, extracted their water, quickened them 
to life and transformed them into a paradise.”79 Not only did non-Jews, such as Colonel T. 
E. Lawrence confirmed that Zionism would benefit the Arabs of Palestine, but even an 
Arab, a king that had been appointed by the British themselves, agreed with this 
estimation. Yet, the Arabs of Palestine had different assessments concerning current and 
future Jewish immigration and its impact on the Arab population.  
Under the title The Future of Palestine (1947), prepared by the Arab Office in 
London, they argued that Zionist settlements had had a negative impact on the Arab 
population, and that it was naïve to think that the Arabs would give up their land and rights 
for economic prosperity. “Such an expectation betrayed both a false political psychology 
and a false diagnosis of the situation. It is absurd to believe that men become less 
interested in political and national questions and more interested in economic ones the 
more prosperous they become.”80 In fact, the Arab Office argued, the opposite was true, 
that both the Mandate and the Zionists were ignoring the fundamental cause of Arab 
opposition: the sense of injured right, the longing for independence, and the desire to 
prevent their own country from passing into alien hands. “No amount of economic benefit 
would persuade a normal people to abandon a position taken up from such motives of 
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principles.”81 The Jewish Agency's calculation that the Palestinian Arabs would simply 
hand over the rule of Palestine to the Zionists in return for economic gain was 
preposterous.  
The Arab Office did not take the bate that Arab quality of life would be improved 
by the establishment of a Jewish state, simply because the current reality proved the 
opposite. The Arab Office stressed that there had been no economic or any other benefit to 
the Palestinian-Arabs from Zionist immigration “to offset the damage it has done to every 
aspect of their life.” The reason for this was that the purpose of Zionist immigration was to 
benefit Jews only. “… The policy of the Zionists has not been to mingle with the 
inhabitants of the country, to co-operate with them and by doing so to create a spirit of 
solidarity; it has been to isolate themselves. This policy of isolation can be seen at work in 
every field of life.”82 They cited examples of land bought by the Jewish National Fund, 
which became the unassailable property of the Jewish people and would never be sold to 
non-Jews. The pressure which Jewish trade unions put on Jewish employers to only hire 
Jewish labour provided a second illustration. 
The Arab Office claimed in sum, that the Zionist argument was flawed. The 
economic arguments that the Zionists were putting forward assumed that the Arabs were 
an uncivilised people whom the Jews would civilize, “or at least they were a stagnant 
people who needed the Jewish stimulus to set them on the path to progress.”83 Were the 
Palestinian-Arabs really in such need of “rescue”? Did the Arabs consider themselves 
uncivilised, or did they consider the Zionist settlers, who were attempting to control the 
majority of Palestine, as uncivilised? 
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An interesting explanation of the Arab fear/animosity felt towards the Jews coming 
from Europe was provided by Pasha Azzam of the Arab League. Azzam argued that the 
Jewish people went to Europe and to the West and came back something else. They had 
returned as Russified Jews, Polish Jews, German Jews, and English Jews. They had come 
back with a totally different conception of things, Western and not Eastern. That does not 
mean that the Arabs were necessarily quarrelling with anyone who came from the West. 
But the Jews, the Arabs’ old cousins, coming back with imperialistic ideas, with 
reactionary or revolutionary ideas and trying to implement them first by British pressure 
and then by American pressure, and then by terrorism on their own part – they were not 
the old cousins they knew, and the Arabs could not extend to them a very good welcome. 
“The Zionist, the new Jew, wants to dominate and he pretends that he has got a particular 
civilizing mission with which he returns to a backwards, degenerated race in order to put 
the elements of progress into an area which has no progress.” Azzam points out that this 
has been the pretension of every power that wanted to colonize and aimed at domination. 
The excuse has always been that the people were backward and that the colonisers had a 
human mission to put the colonised forward. The Arabs simply refused.  “We are not 
reactionary and we are not backwards. Even if we are ignorant, the difference between 
ignorance and knowledge is ten years in school.” The Arabs, said Azzam, were a living, 
and a vitally strong nation, who were in their renaissance. “We still have our brains. We 
have a heritage of civilisation and of spiritual life. We are not going to allow ourselves to 
be controlled either by great nations or small nations or dispersed nations.”84 
While the Jewish Agency tried to convince the Committee that the Arabs would 
benefit greatly from Jewish immigration, the Arab population was not buying into it, and 
utterly refused the prospect that the Arabs’ needs would be fulfilled by the new Jewish 
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immigrants. The Jewish Agency’s tactic at attempting to prove that the Arabs could benefit 
from Zionism failed. It failed because the past and current practice proved that Palestinian-
Arabs were not part of a society the Zionists were creating in Palestine; it failed, because 
the interest of the Zionists to establish a Jewish state in Palestine went against the need of 
the Arabs not to be dominated by others, as they had for so many years; and it failed 
because the Jewish Agency did not advocate cooperation with the Arabs, but rather one-
sided “assistance,” or “management”. The Committee was not convinced either. Had the 
Jewish Agency said: “We have the finances, the Arabs have the knowledge of how to work 
the land, let us have the opportunity to work together to improve the lives of both sides,” 
perhaps then the Jewish Agency would have had a convincing case for the Committee, as 
only then would the needs of both sides be met. Anything less would only benefit one side 
temporarily, the Jewish side, until the Arabs would have enough of feeling marginalized in 
a land they considered theirs, and war would break out. So the question was: what idea 
would benefit both Arabs and Jews? And who would convince the Committee of it? 
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“The Only Reasonable Man in Palestine” 
 
Crossman wrote in his diary on March 14th, 1946 of Dr. Judah Magnes: “I have 
been scared of his evidence for some time because I was certain that it would appeal to 
most of the committee. Sure enough it did.”85 Dr. Judah Magnes was the head of the 
Hebrew University in Jerusalem. A native of San Francisco, Dr. Magnes had given up his 
pulpit as rabbi of Temple Emanu’el in New York during WWI because of his pacifist 
convictions, and came to Palestine. He was well known for his advocacy of the bi-
nationalism plan for Palestine, which proposed that immigration should be controlled to 
allow the same number of Jews in Palestine as Arabs. He was also in favour of equal 
representation in the government of Palestine, and formed the Ichud (Union) party, which 
at the time of the Committee’s inquiries was non-political, to pursue this cause.86 Dr. 
Magnes was regarded by British officials in Palestine as a “genuinely moderate Jew who is 
working for conciliation with the Arabs.”87 Crossman never explained why he was afraid 
of Dr. Magnes’s testimony, but perhaps it was because Dr. Magnes would be able to 
distinguish between needs and interests of the Jewish people, and would be able to provide 
a concrete base to his arguments. Perhaps Crossman was afraid that even though Dr. 
Magnes’ arguments would make sense, he knew that logic would not be the prevailing 
force in Palestine. 
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“Our view is based on two assumptions,” Dr. Magnes declared. “First, that the 
Jewish-Arab co-operation is essential for a satisfactory solution; and, second, that it is 
possible. The alternative is war, but the plain Jews and the plain Arabs do not want war.”88
  
When Crossman began questioning Dr. Magnes, after other Committee members 
ended their queries, he started by saying: “I was asking about you this morning, and 
somebody told me that you were the only reasonable person in Palestine. When I was 
listening to you, I began to see why he paid you that compliment…”89 Crossman 
questioned Dr. Magnes, not on the details of his bi-national plan, but on the practicality of 
it. He raised four points that would cause Dr. Magnes’ plan to succeed or fail: 
1. Agreement between the political leaders on both sides. 
2. Agreement on both sides of nationalistic fervour among the rank and file.90 
3.  Confidence on both sides that the other side is going to keep to its agreement to 
give up its ultimate desire (a nationalistic Arab or Jewish state); and confidence 
that they will continue agreeing on that later on. 
4. An administration capable of the extremely skilful job of conducting this together.  
 
Crossman wanted to know how Dr. Magnes planned on achieving these four point. 
Putting aside the last point, Dr. Magnes answered: “…through life, and not just through 
discussion, through establishing vital interests for both people, by establishing contact, not 
in debating society, but in boards that have to do with the determination of the absorptive 
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capacity of the country.”91 Dr. Magnes proposed establishing a regional trusteeship council 
representing both peoples, and going through the various organs of government, “that is 
the way to bring people together who are at the present time unhappily far apart, and who 
simply can’t be brought together by appealing to abstract qualities.”92 By cooperation, and 
not by unilateral actions, Dr. Magnes believed, both the Arabs and the Jews would be able 
to meet each others’ needs. This was in stark contrast to the proposals of the Jewish 
Agency, who only proposed to “help” the Arabs, rather then work with them.  
Dr. Magnes admitted that although he had a following for his ideas in Palestine, it 
was not large, but that “a large part of the inarticulate section of the population believes 
more or less as we do.”93 He took part of the blame for not organising the population to 
think the way his party did, but also claimed that a moderate programme did not have the 
same appeal in days of war as an extreme programme had.  
Crossman then asked if he believed Arab-Jewish relations had deteriorated lately, 
despite efforts of getting both Jews and Arabs to work together, to which Dr. Magnes 
answered “yes.” Dr. Magnes also did not want to speak on behalf of the Jewish Agency 
about their reception of his plan for a bi-national state, even though Crossman insisted that 
the success or failure of such an initiative lay in the hand of an organisation recognised by 
the Mandate as the representatives of the Jewish people of Palestine. But what about the 
Arabs – would they be willing to cooperate with the Jews? Not wanting to speak on behalf 
of the Arab League or the Arab High Committee either, Dr. Magnes suggested making the 
Jewish Agency and the Arab League parallel. In fact, he wanted to make all Jewish and 
Arab organisations, in charge of their own population, parallel to each other, so that there 
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was a counterpoint. By doing so, the Arabs would realise that the Jews did not intend to 
dominate them, but rather be their equals.  
When Crossman returned to the fourth point he made above, “An administration 
capable of the extremely skilful job of conducting this together,” Dr. Magnes said he 
believed that collaboration within the Palestine government should take place between 
Arabs and Jews, while the transition from Mandate to independence took place, and 
implored the Committee for self-government. Dr. Magnes suggested that the minor 
positions in the Palestine government be filled by Arabs and Jews, simply because the 
English were not part of this country, and that it was time for Arabs and Jews to begin 
heading departments within the Palestine government. The only way to teach self-
government, argued Dr. Magnes, was to distribute responsibility. “You can’t get self-
government by governing other people.”94 How were the British preparing Palestine for 
independence, as their mandate stipulated, if they were not preparing its inhabitants to 
govern themselves? What Dr. Magnes was suggesting was the policy that the British 
should have exercised from the inception of their Mandate, and which they had failed to 
implement.  
The most important point Dr. Magnes made was in response to Crum’s question on 
partition. It is worth quoting this exchange verbatim, because it emphasises the idea that 
both the Jews and the Arabs would have to rely on each other for their future success in 
Palestine, and that their lives would become intertwined, whether they liked it or not:95 
 
Crum: Does your organisation reject completely the idea of partition? 
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Dr. Magnes: I would like to give you my own opinion. We have no official stand on that. I 
reject partition absolutely. I think this it is a moral defeat for everyone concerned. 
It is a confession of failure.  
Crum: Let us assume that.  
Dr. Magnes: But you mustn’t assume that.  
Crum: It might be the only answer.  
Dr. Magnes: No, it isn’t the only answer. You have, in the first place, in these two tiny 
partitioned States, the same problem in toto as you have in this bi-national State. 
You have a majority and a minority. How are you going to treat them? If you are 
going to treat them as majorities and minorities – one dominant people and one 
subservient people – that is one way to do it. If you are going to treat them as we 
propose, on the lines of parity in the Jewish State or in the Arab State, why not do 
it in the complete State? Moreover, you would find, I think, that the administration 
boundaries would be very hard to set up.  
And what is the greatest importance to me is this: That you then separate the Jews from the 
Arabs instead of bringing them together. You separate them as though they were 
two dogs fighting on the street and you had to put them into separate kennels. That 
is not the case. Some people may use that figure of speech, but it isn’t true. The 
only way to get people to work together is to get them to live together, to get to 
know one another, and you can’t do that by putting them into separate 
compartments. If you put them into these compartments, what is going on now in 
both Arab and Jewish schools will be accentuated to a very large degree. 
Unfortunately, at the present time you have a large amount of the bitterest 
nationalism, which you might call chauvinism, being given expression to both here 
and there.  
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I dread the day when, in a few years time, after this partition, you will get a group of 
young Jews and a group of young Arabs, on both sides of this irredentist border, 
going after one another in just the same way as the militarists today want to have 
the field for a trial of arms. Why do that? It’s a large problem. No one can 
guarantee its success [a bi-national state], but it is worth trying. It is a great 
challenge; it is the Holy Land. Why mangle this conception of the Holy Land? 
Here are two people, descendants of the great Semitic people of antiquity. They 
can naturally work together. We have to find the way; we have to try to convince 
everyone that this is just and that it is sound. You don’t have to do this partitioning.  
 
Dr. Magnes was able to predict a future that made sense to him, and made sense to 
the Committee, too. If one separates two people who wish to live on the same land that 
separation will only cause more strife, and will only cause more animosity, simply because 
each side will feel they deserve more than the other. The same problem that would occur 
in two states on the same land will result in the same problem in a bi-national state. The 
only difference is that a bi-national state would eventually meet the needs of both people, 
rather than their interests, but only if both sides desired so, and if only the leadership of 
both sides advocated for that. That is why it was so important for Dr. Magnes that the 
leadership of both people be parallel to each other, and thus lead their own followers into 
cooperation, rather then into competition with each other. It was only through cooperation 
that security and success could be guaranteed to both Jews and Arabs. 
Dr. Magnes was trying to extract the needs of both Jews and Arabs, rather then fall 
back on the interests both sides were voicing. He argued that immigration into Palestine 
was what Jews most wanted, that was also their need. “Give us the chance of an ample 
immigration, and many of the sincerest advocates of the Jewish state will forgo the 
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state.”96 He then argued that what Arabs wanted most was self-government, that that was 
their need. “Give them self-government, and many of the sincerest opponents of Jewish 
immigration will acquiesce.” Was Dr. Magnes naïve as to the true desire of people like 
Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok? Was not Jewish immigration a step towards the 
creation of a Jewish state, and not an end in itself? Would the Arabs stand by while 
European Jews immigrated to Palestine? Dr. Magnes's plan could easily fail if there was 
no communication between the leaders of the Arabs and the Jews, and so he was pushing 
the Committee to recommend a scenario in which people like Ben-Gurion would have to 
talk to his counterpart on the "other side."  
Although Crossman greatly admired Dr. Magnes, he also argued that it was a great 
mistake to believe that the difference between moderate Zionists and extreme Zionists was 
one of principle. “Weizmann, Magnes, and Ben-Gurion are in complete agreement about 
the objectives, the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. On this, Magnes 
is just as extreme as a member of the Stern Gang. What they differ about is tactic.”97 
Weizmann, argues Crossman, thought it was a tactical mistake to demand a Jewish state at 
once; and “Magnes thinks it is a mistake in tactics to demand a Jewish state at all. But they 
all want to see the Jews as much as home in Palestine as the Americans in America.”98 
Here, Crossman is mistaken. By Dr. Magnes not seeking a Jewish state at all, how 
was he the same as Weizmann, Ben-Gurion or the Stern Gang? He was not, for he was not 
seeking to dominate land or people in favour of a nationalistic goal, when the others were. 
Crossman continued to argue that Dr. Magnes’ ideas would be alright “if all the Jews were 
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as patient and rational as he is; if the Arabs were not certain that the British are on their 
[Jewish] side,” and if British Prime Minister Atlee was able to replace all the key officials 
in Palestine by people who believed in the national home, and in helping the Arabs and the 
Jews to work together. “But isn’t that just utopia?”99  
This is exactly what Dr. Magnes was trying to emphasize, that if the leadership of 
Jews and Arabs agreed on the importance of cooperation, then their people would follow 
suit. The Jewish people would become patient and rational if their leadership exemplified 
patience and rationality. But the Jewish Agency was not patient, because its main goal was 
the fulfilment of Zionism, the establishment of a Jewish state without cooperating with the 
Arabs. The Jewish Agency was not looking for a utopian solution, but its very own 
solution, believing that the creation of a Jewish state would meet the needs of their 
followers. 
Whether the solution was utopian or not, Judge Hutcheson recognised what the 
entire Committee saw in Dr. Magnes.  “You are not denominated a Christian, Dr. 
Magnes,” he said, “but you talk as I should like Christians to act. I am not ready to assess 
your proposal, but I am a fairly old man, and I recognize moral power when I see it.”100 
What Dr. Magnes proposed met the needs of both Jews and Arabs – immigration of Jewish 
Holocaust survivors who had nowhere to go, and Arab self-governance. Although not 
clearly stated, Dr. Magnes understood that a Jewish state would harm not only the Arabs, 
but the Jews, too. He recognized that the interest of the Jewish Agency in establishing a 
Jewish stated would not meet the long-term needs of the Jewish people, to live in a 
peaceful and prosperous environment, but rather be the cause of continuous strife.  
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Nevertheless, the needs of the Arabs or the Jews were not what the British government 
were concerned with; their own interests ultimately led the way to their solution of the 
Palestine quagmire. And the US simply stepped aside. 
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The Interests of Outside Forces  
 
So far, this paper concentrated mostly on the needs and interests of the Jewish 
Holocaust survivors in the DP camps, the various Zionist leaders, both within the Jewish 
Agency and outside it, and some Arab voices. However, the Palestine issue could not be 
resolved in a bubble, and the outcome would have to include the interests of outside 
forces, which had their own stakes in Palestine. In an ideal world, the Jews and the Arabs 
would have resolved their differences between themselves, but this was no utopian world. 
The British, the Americans, and the Russians, each had their own perspective, their own 
wishes, and their own goals in the Middle East. This section looks at the Committee's 
recommendations, and how the interests of the British and Americans governments, who 
had a stake in the Committee’s proposals, affected their responses to implementing the 
Committee's recommendations. Neither the needs nor the interests of the Jewish or Arab 
people were taken into consideration.   
When the Committee first crossed the Atlantic Ocean from the American continent 
to Europe at the beginning of their investigation, they were presented with a document 
marked: “Contents of file of confidential communications on Palestine supplied by 
Division of Near Eastern Affairs for use of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.”  The 
document dealt with seventeen items – despatches, cables, correspondence, and 
memoranda of conversations. This was a resume of the State Department secret file on 
Palestine, Crum wrote, that not even President Truman had known. According to this file, 
since September 15, 1938, “each time a promise was made to American Jewry regarding 
Palestine, the State Department promptly sent messages to the Arab rulers discounting it 
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and reassuring them, in effect, that regardless of what was promised publicly to the Jews, 
nothing would be done to change the situation in Palestine.” As Crum pointed out, this file 
confirmed the charges of double-dealing that had been hurled at both the US and 
Britain.101 The Committee was adamant not to have this occur with their investigation.   
The first recommendation of the report that the Committee issued to their 
respective governments on April 20, 1946, read: “We have to report that such information 
as we received about countries other than Palestine gave no hope of substantial assistance 
in finding homes for Jews wishing or impelled to leave Europe.”102 The Committee argued 
that Palestine alone cannot meet the emigration needs of all the Jewish victims in Europe 
and that the whole world shared the responsibility for settling them and all other displaced 
persons, “irrespective of creed or nationality.” The Committee recognised that many of the 
Nazis’ victims would remain in Europe and so it was the responsibility of both the US and 
British governments to secure their rights under the United Nations Charter, calling for 
“universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedom for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” 
As for the Jewish displaced people themselves, the report recommended that 
100,000 certificates be authorised immediately for admission into Palestine, and that these 
certificates be awarded that same year, 1946. The report commented that the number of 
Jewish refugees far exceeded 100,000, and that there were more than this in Germany, 
Austria and Italy alone. It emphasised the need to close down those “camps” in which the 
Jewish survivors were waiting, and who were living in the same environment in which 
they had been persecuted. Due to immigration laws of other countries, the report said, “We 
know of no other country to which the great majority can go in the immediate future other 
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than Palestine. Furthermore that is where almost all of them want to go. There they are 
sure that they will receive a welcome denied elsewhere. There they hope to enjoy peace 
and rebuild their lives.”103 
Although his name is not mentioned in the report, the third recommendation, 
assigned to the question of partitioning Palestine, was very similar to the testimony Dr. 
Magnes gave. The report recommended that Palestine be established as “a country in 
which the legitimate national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs can be reconciled.” The 
Committee wanted to avoid the need for a majority to establish a state, as that would 
become the cause for conflict in Palestine. It wanted the constitution of the country to 
ensure that the need for a majority would be made purposeless.104 
And so, under the headline of Mandate and United Nations Trusteeship, the 
Committee’s fourth recommendation concluded that  
The hostility between Jews and Arabs and, in particular, the determination of 
each to achieve domination, if necessary, by violence, make it almost certain that, 
now and for some time to come, any attempt to establish either an independent 
Palestinian State or independent Palestinian States would result in civil strife 
such as might threaten the peace of the world.105 
 
The Committee thus recommended that until this hostility disappeared, the 
Government of Palestine be continued as at present under mandate pending the execution 
of a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations. The Committee recognised that the 
Peel Commission of 1937 had already admitted that the Mandate was unworkable, and so 
did the League of Nations. In 1939, two years after the Peel Commission, the British 
government issued a White Paper, and announced it would take steps to terminate the 
Mandate and establish an independent Palestinian state. “Our recommendations,” says the 
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Committee’s report, “are based on what we believe at this stage to be as fair a measure of 
justice to all as we can find in view of what has gone before and of all that has been 
done.”106 The Committee was aware that they were not in accord with the claims of either 
Jews or Arabs, and that they supported departure from the recent policy of the Mandatory. 
The Committee also recognised that if their recommendations were adopted, they will 
involve a long period of trusteeship, “which will mean a very heavy burden for any single 
Government to undertake,” but a burden which would be lightened if the difficulties were 
appreciated and the Trustee had the support of the United Nations.  
The Committee’s report illustrated how distressing the situation was, that in fact, 
this was a conflict of right against right. While each side overstated their case, each side 
had a legitimate case. As the Arab Office in London explained, the Jews wanted to save 
more victims from the wreck of Europe; the Arabs want to avoid the danger of becoming a 
minority in a Jewish state. “Therefore a just solution would be one which opens the doors 
to Palestine to further Jewish immigration but at the same time safeguards the Arabs 
against it being turned into a Jewish state.”107 The Arab Office did not argue that this is 
what it wanted; instead, this recommendation reflected how outsiders, like the Committee, 
viewed the solution to European Jews’ displacement and the conflict within Palestine. 
Based on what the Committee witnessed, heard, and experienced, the above 
recommendations were meant to meet the needs of all those concerned, and not just Jewish 
or Arab interests.  
When the report was discussed for the first time in the British cabinet on April 24, 
1946, the only person to support the report was Foreign Secretary Bevin, who promised 
the Committee he would do so, if they reached their recommendations unanimously. He 
hoped that the report would lead the US government to cooperate in solving the Palestine 
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problem the British were facing. Prime Minister Atlee was highly critical of the report, 
arguing that in effect no other country except Palestine would contribute to absorbing the 
Holocaust survivors. Atlee also feared angering both the Arabs and the Jews against the 
British government, and feared extended pressure by the US to allow 100,000 Jews into 
Palestine.108 These were but some of the reasons the recommendations of the Committee 
were being shelved. 
Another reason the British government attempted to find different avenues than the 
ones proposed by the Committee, was the insistence of Prime Minister Atlee that the 
Haganah be disarmed, before the 100,000 Jewish immigrants be allowed into Palestine. 
Podet argues that Attlee knew well that British forces could not disarm the Haganah, as it 
meant disarming the majority of the Jewish population. Partition, therefore, seemed like a 
very attractive and safer (for British troops) solution, as conflict between British forces and 
the Haganah would be avoided, and after partition, British troops would leave.109 An 
additional reason the British looked at other possibilities was because they knew that no 
help from the US would be given to implement the Committee’s recommendations. The 
British knew they would need extra military support in order to allow 100,000 Jews into 
Palestine, and prevent a conflict between Arabs, Jews, and British forces. The US had no 
interest in sending troops to Palestine. 
Perhaps by looking at the bigger picture, Britain’s failure to implement the report 
can be blamed on the fact that the Committee studied the Palestine problem in abstraction 
from world strategy. Crossman points out that while in Cairo and Jerusalem, he realised 
that the procedure of studying the Arab and Jewish problem, without taking into account 
other forces was farcical. “Any policy for the national home [for the Jewish people] must 
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form part of a Middle Eastern policy; and a Middle Eastern policy must form part of a 
world policy.”110 The report had embarrassed the British Government because it 
challenged implicitly the principles of British imperial policy at a time when a new 
struggle, the Cold War, was beginning for control of the Middle East.   
The US in turn, accepted the report, as President Truman either did not see, or 
refused to see, the Palestine issue as a political problem, but rather he saw the report as 
solving a refugee problem. As the US was not prepared to provide troops to implement the 
report (as Prime Minister Atlee required, but which the report itself did not specify) it was 
not at any political risk when it pressured the British for the implementation of the report 
and the allocation of 100,000 certificates to Jewish DP. President Truman simply saw 
Palestine as a British issue, which did not require US interference.111 
The first public notice of the Committee’s recommendation appeared on July 22, 
1946. Ironically, it was the same day the Irgun blew up the King David Hotel, killing 
ninety-one people. It was also around the same time the Grady-Morrison meetings were 
considering other solutions for Palestine. The Grady-Morrison meetings were established 
as an alternative to the Committee’s recommendations, and looked, once again, into the 
idea of partition. The Arabs rejected the plan, insisting that the entire country should 
remain under a representative government, and the Zionist leadership rejected it on the 
ground that the territory assigned to them was not enough, and that the plan did not give 
them sufficient control over immigration.112 Once again, the British fell back on the 
“easier” solution to Palestine – partition, and once again the idea of partition was not 
accepted by any of the parties.  
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At this point, President Truman told Prime Minister Atlee that he could not accept 
the proposed Grady-Morrison plan because both the Arabs and the Jews did not agree to it, 
that the US could not participate in any further discussions, and that Britain was free to 
seek its own solution. As Frank Sakran wrote in Palestine Dilemma – Arab Rights Versus 
Zionist Aspirations (1948), “Thus it seemed at the time that America washed its hands of 
this difficult problem and threw it back into Great Britain’s lap – where it rightly 
belonged.”113 During 1946 and 1947 the British government attempted to find solutions to 
the Palestine issue by inviting both Arab and Jewish delegates to conferences held in 
London. The Arab states accepted, while the Jewish leadership rejected the invitations, 
emphasising their displeasure at the postponement of admitting the 100,000 Jewish 
survivors, which the Committee had originally recommended. The British government 
thus attempted to convince the Arab delegates to accept the idea of partition, insisting it 
was the best solution. The Arabs rejected it, arguing they wanted Palestine to be under one 
government, which would represent adequately its inhabitants – this would mean an Arab 
majority, and thus the end of the Zionists’ aspirations.  
The British government finally reached the point where it admitted it had no 
solutions to offer. In a speech delivered to the House of Commons, on February 25, 1947, 
Foreign Secretary Bevin explained the reasons for the failure of the London conference, 
which meant to bring both Arabs and Jews to the negotiating table, to implement the 
Committee’s report: 
The course of events has led His Majesty’s Government to decide that the problem 
of Palestine must be referred to the United Nations…The problem of Palestine is a 
very complex one. There is no denying the fact that the Mandate contained 
contradictory promises. In the first place it promised the Jews a National Home, 
and, in the second place it declared that the rights and position of the Arabs must 
be protected. Therefore, it provided for what was virtually an invasion of the 
country of thousands of immigrants, and at the same time said that this was not to 
disturb the people in possession. The question therefore arose whether this could be 
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accomplished without a conflict, and the events in the last 25 years have proved 
that it could not.114  
 
The British government’s main objective was to meet its own interests, which is 
why the Mandate included contradictory promises. After more than two decades, none of 
the parties involved, neither the Arabs nor the Jews trusted the British. Trust would have 
required time and steady positive moves, and Britain took all the wrong steps along the 
way.  
In The Jewish Emergence from Powerlessness (1979), Bauer poses this question: 
What made the British government go to the United Nations? Bauer argues that it was the 
decisive influence of American pressure which prevented Britain from implementing its 
anti-Zionist policy, a policy that did not allow for the creation of a Jewish state. In turn, the 
pressure on the US government was motivated by the presence of the Holocaust survivors 
in the DP camps under US control (which Ben-Gurion had planned all along). This 
pressure, argues Bauer, was kept up on US decision-makers by American Jewry, 
“cultivating a receptive American public.”115 So the establishment of the State of Israel 
and the consequent achievement of a political power base for the Jewish people were made 
possible, to a large degree, by the Jews in the Diaspora. By saying this, Bauer tries to 
correct the impression that the main factor leading to the Jewish statehood was the activity 
of the Jewish underground movements in Palestine. But he emphasises that all this was 
built on “the fundamental contribution of pre-war Zionist movement, of three generations 
of Zionist immigrants.” He also writes, “There is no doubt that the influence of the 
organised Holocaust survivors, and of the American pressure which was related to this 
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problem, set the stage for the Zionist’s diplomatic triumph.”116 The Jewish holocaust 
survivors’ presence in the DP camps (especially in the American zones), pressure from the 
Jewish population in the US, and Zionist activities within Palestine, all contributed to the 
creation of the State of Israel. The interest of the Zionist ideology would finally be met, the 
needs of its followers would not, and the result would be just what Dr. Magnes predicted: 
War, animosity, and competition for a land both people would want to have as their own.  
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Conclusion  
 
This paper focused on the difference between the needs and the interests of both 
the Jewish people in the DP camps, and of the Zionist leaders who were advocating for a 
Jewish state in Palestine. The Jewish survivors in the DP camps were eager to find a place 
where they could begin a fresh start to their lives. While the gates to many countries 
remained closed to them, the Zionist ideology offered them what no-one else did – hope. 
This hope was a source of motivation which the survivors required to lift themselves from 
the ashes of their loved ones’ graves; it gave meaning to their suffering and a goal to 
pursue. The survivors needed Zionism, an ideology that embraced them, when everyone 
else, who was not a Zionist, did not. What they were not aware of was the impact that 
practicing their ideology would have on them and the Jewish people of Palestine. The 
practice of Zionism would have offered them the safety and security they so longed for, if 
it was exercised in a place where there was no-one else. Palestine, however, was settled by 
those who never did, were not, and could never practice Zionism, simply because they 
were not Jews. This would mean that the Jews in Palestine would find themselves in 
conflict with the Arabs of Palestine; as a result, Zionist ideology’s promise of a peaceful 
and prosperous environment for the Jewish people could not be fulfilled. Thus, the practice 
of Zionism in Palestine would not provide its followers with their need, what they must 
have to lead a secure and prosperous life. Ironically, Zionism’s goals-- freedom for Jews to 
practice their religion and to be leaders of their communities and their respective 
countries-- has been achieved in areas outside of Palestine/Israel – mainly North America 
and Western Europe – Zionism was achieved outside Zion. 
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The Zionist leaders, both within the Jewish Agency and outside of it, preached that 
the Jewish people were different from others, and thus required different rules and 
different privileges not granted to others. They argued that the Jewish people were in fact a 
nation which deserved a state, and the fact that others lived on the land where they 
proposed to locate that state did not matter. They tried to convince the Committee that the 
Jewish state would, in fact, assist the Arab population rather then harm it even when the 
facts on the ground proved the opposite. They were, as Dr. Magnes suggested, “State 
mad.” For them the state was the end, and not the means to achieve peacefulness and 
prosperity. They saw a Jewish state as a means to defend the Jewish people, instead of 
realising that it was the idea and practice of Zionism itself that was endangering the Jews. 
The Zionist leaders could not see the benefit of working together with the Arabs, as their 
nationalistic ideology did not allow for a broad understanding of issues, offering instead a 
limited view of options. The option of cooperation was not one of them. Therefore, the 
Zionist leaders focused on the interest of the Jewish people, rather than on their needs. 
Dr. Magnes, founder of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, a former rabbi and an 
educated individual, was able to predict all that has happened from the moment the 
partition of Palestine was announced by the United Nations in 1947. The people of 
Palestine, both the Jews and the Arabs, were set apart, rather than encouraged to work 
together. This has only increased the animosity, the competition, and the conflicts between 
two people who desire to live on the same land. It has increased the desire of Jews and 
Arabs to compete for their interests, rather than to cooperate to fulfil their needs.   
The Committee had predicted this outcome in their recommendations, and believed 
that the implementation of their recommendations would have achieved the needs of both 
people. The Committee did not fail; instead, their governments failed by refusing to 
implement the Committee’s recommendations. The British and American governments 
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failed because they did not seek what Jews and Arabs really needed, but rather what their 
own governments were interested in. Britain dug itself into a hole, and the US was not 
prepared to dig Britain out. The Committee, for its part, did the best it could do under the 
circumstances, and offered the best advice to the people who would be affected the most. 
If the Committee had attempted to look at the interests of other forces, it would have 
realised that a solution would have been impossible. It was difficult enough to find 
solutions for two people in Palestine; it would have been impossible to find a solution that 
also included Britain and the US.  
It was the needs of both people that Arabs and Jews had in common: a need for a 
free and secure life, free of domination by another. These needs still remain the same 
today. Perhaps it is time to once again focus on what people must have, rather than on 
what they really want. Perhaps then Jews and Arabs will realise that what they must have 
is actually the same, and that each can only attain it by providing it to the other.  
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